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SPORTS LAW
Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National
Basketball Association: A Fan-Friendly Decision?
874 F. Surp. 844 (N.D. ILL. 1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is part of a series of decisions, the first of which, Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n ("NBA I"),' was
handed down on January 24, 1991. In order to understand the issues presented in
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
("NBA IF"),2 an examination of the holding in NBA I is necessary. This note
will begin with a discussion of the facts and holding in NBA I, followed in Part
MI by a thorough examination of the issues raised and the legal analysis applied
in NBA II. Part IV will then examine the conclusions reached in Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n ("NBA II-A"),3 the
most recent decision in this continuing saga of litigation. Part V will attempt to
address a few issues raised by this litigation.
I1. BACKGROUND
In NBA I, the WGN Continental Broadcasting Company ("WGN"), a
superstation, and the Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership's profes-
sional basketball team, the Chicago Bulls ("the Bulls"), brought an action against
the National Basketball Association ("NBA") after the NBA reduced the number
of games that individual teams could broadcast on superstations.4 Superstations
are "independent, over-the-air television stations that broadcast in their local
market areas and are also carried by cable systems to other parts of the coun-
try."5 In the five basketball seasons prior to the 1990-91 season, the NBA's
superstation rules allowed every NBA franchise to broadcast up to twenty-five
games on a superstation. However, effective for the 1990-91 season, the NBA
Board of Governors adopted a rule reducing the number of superstation broad-
casts to twenty games. As a result of the NBA's new rule, the Bulls and WGN
sought to enjoin the NBA from reducing the number of Bulls' games that WGN
1. 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. IM. 1991).
2. 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
3. No. 90C6247, 1995 WL 519753 (N.D. Il. Aug. 30, 1995).
4. NBA 1, 754 F. Supp. at 1339.
5. Id. at 1338.
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could televise.6
In NBA I, the Bulls and WGN alleged that the NBA's new rule constituted a
horizontal agreement among the NBA teams to restrict output and to boycott
superstations in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 After a thorough
analysis that examined the history of the NBA's television policies, the logistics
of superstations, WGN's broadcast agreement with the Bulls, and television
coverage of Bulls' games in Chicago and around the country, the district court
concluded that the NBA's proposal, to reduce the number of Bulls' games
broadcast by WGN, was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.' The court reached its decision after a determination that the
anticompetitive effects of the NBA's five-game reduction had been established
and that the NBA's justifications offered in defense of its action were inade-
quate.9 As a result, the court issued an injunction barring the NBA from reduc-
ing the number of games that can be broadcast by a superstation."
In Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
("NBA I-A"), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling , but suggested that there may be certain means by which the NBA, with-
out violating federal antitrust laws, might still be able to prevent WGN from dis-
tributing Bulls' games on a national level." First, there is the possibility that the
NBA could characterize itself as a single entity competing against other forms of
entertainment. 2 Also, the NBA could make an argument that restraining the
number of superstation broadcasts would expand output by preventing small-
market teams from having to compete with superstation broadcasts, thus enhanc-
ing the ability of those teams to draw from their own markets.'3 Additionally,
the court suggested that the NBA could acquire a property interest in all broad-
casting rights. 4 Moreover, the NBA could levy some type of tax or fee for each
game broadcast on a superstation.'" However, because the NBA failed to rebut
the district court's characterization of the NBA as a "joint venture in the produc-
tion of games but more like a cartel in the sale of its output,"' 6 the Seventh Cir-
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1339. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part, "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal.... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
8. Chicago Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n ("NBA I"),
754 F. Supp. 1336, 1339 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
9. Id. at 1363.
10. Id. at 1364.
11. 961 F.2d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 672.
13. Id. at 673.
14. Id. at 674.
15. Id. at 675-76.
16. Id. at 672.
[Vol. VI:247
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cuit concluded that there was "no adequate reason for us to disturb the judg-
ment."
17
Against this backdrop, the issues decided in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n ("NBA II") s arose. After the NBA
was enjoined, in NBA I, from reducing the number of Bulls' games televised on
WGN, the NBA sought to impose a superstation fee for Bulls' games carried on
WGN. 9 At the same time, the Bulls and WGN sought the right to televise up to
forty-one Bulls' games on WGN. ° In this second action, WGN and the Bulls
alleged that any limitation on the number of Bulls' games broadcast on WGN
was a naked restraint in violation of the antitrust laws.2' They further asserted
that there were three unlawful restraints at issue: (1) a total ban on superstation
broadcasts of Bulls' games; (2) the blackout restriction which would have banned
any club from showing games over a superstation on the same night that any
NBA game is being shown on TNT or WTBS; and (3) the tax on superstation
broadcasts.' The NBA, in turn, sought to implement the suggestions proffered
by the Seventh Circuit in NBA I, hoping that it could have the injunction lift-
ed.
The district court in NBA II proceeded to look specifically at each of the six
suggestions made by the Seventh Circuit in NBA I-A, in order to determine
whether or not the NBA had made the necessary changes which would entitle it
to prohibit or restrict the showing of any Bulls' game on WGN.24 The six sug-
gestions discussed in NBA I were as follows: (1) establish that the NBA and all
of its franchises comprise a "single entity," rendering its actions unreviewable for
antitrust purposes; (2) transfer all team copyrights to the NBA; (3) transfer all
the broadcast rights to NBA games to NBC and then cap the number of national
telecasts; (4) demonstrate that limiting the distribution of Bulls' games on WGN
will actually expand output by preventing superstation broadcasts from cutting
into the local audiences of weaker teams; (5) attempt to show that elimination of
all Bulls' games on WGN will not cause the Bulls or WGN to suffer any anti-
trust injury; and (6) impose a superstation fee which would be shared equally by
all teams in order to prevent the Bulls from having an unfair advantage over
teams with no access to superstation broadcasts.'
After a thorough analysis of the effects of each of these suggestions and how
the NBA responded to them, the district court concluded that the prohibition of
any Bulls' games on WGN would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
furthermore, the NBA's attempts at avoiding the application of antitrust laws
17. Id. at 677.
18. 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
19. Id. at 846.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 846-47.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 847-63.
25. Id. at 847.
1996]
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were invalid.26 Further, the court stated that while the superstation blackout
might be invalid, a superstation fee might be valid, but should be negotiated
among the parties before asking the court to rule.27 Finally, the court held that
restraining the distribution of games by WGN to less than thirty games was
unreasonable.' As a result, the court modified the injunction issued in NBA I,
changing the number of games from twenty-five to not less than thirty and, in
addition, retained jurisdiction over any future controversies arising out of the
injunction.29
Ill. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In reaching its conclusion, the NBA II court analyzed each of the Seventh
Circuit's six recommendations noted above. In order to understand how the court
reached its conclusion, an examination of the court's approach to each of these
recommendations is necessary.
A. The Single Entity Theory
The NBA attempted to establish that, "despite its 27 or more independently
owned and managed teams, [the NBA] is a single enterprise." In making this
assertion, the NBA relied on the holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.,3' which stated that "a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
are [considered] a single entity for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act." '
The NBA argued that the scope of antitrust protection under Copperweld had
been broadened to include other legally distinct, yet substantively unified, busi-
ness organizations.3"
The district court, however, pointed out that a single entity cannot exist when
any of the joint members of the alleged single entity "are, or have been, actual
or potential competitors."34 The court then stated that while some cooperation
among NBA teams is indeed a necessary element of the league's structure, the
profit motives of one team are often at odds with those of other teams.' As
evidence of this, the court stated that in addition to competing for points on the
basketball court, NBA teams compete with each other for players, coaches, com-
mercial advertising, fan support and ticket sales. 6 As further evidence of the




30. Id. at 848.
31. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
32. NBA 11, 874 F. Supp. 844, 848 (N.D. 111. 1995) (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
33. Id. (citing City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.
1988)).
34. NBA i, 874 F. Supp. at 848 (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 276).
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competing interests among teams in the NBA, the court cited the NBA's limited
control over the actions of individual franchises, pointing out that each team is
independently owned and operated and that the league has no power to review or
disapprove the business decisions of an individual team.37 In response, the NBA
claimed that regardless of each team's independent management and control,
individual teams are a creation of the league and that no individual team can
produce an NBA game or season on its own."
The court dismissed the NBA's argument by pointing out that a more accurate
characterization of the NBA is as a creation of the individual teams because, by
a three-fourths vote, the teams actually have the power to dissolve the league.39
Further, the court noted that professional basketball teams have been around
longer than the NBA and, therefore, have been able to "produce" games both
with and without the NBA.' The court therefore concluded that the NBA "is a
joint venture of competing teams capable of colluding in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act."'"
B. Transfer of the Teams' Copyrights to the NBA
In NBA I, the court pointed out that the individual NBA franchises owned the
copyrights to their games, programs and other copyrighted products.42 That
court further noted that while two teams own the copyrights to a particular game,
either one may individually grant a non-exclusive license to a third party without
the permission of the other team, and every NBA team does so with respect to
the sale of copyrighted products that involve more than one team.43 The court
also noted that the NBA acts only as an agent for the teams generating substan-
tial revenue under the various contracts to which individual NBA teams are a
44party.
In response to NBA 1, the NBA commissioner, in an effort to control the
license distribution of copyrighted NBA games, recommended that the teams
transfer all of their copyrights to the NBA.45 The teams agreed to transfer the
copyrights to the NBA, however the NBA continued to authorize individual
teams to sell their copyrighted products as they had done prior to the NBA's
acquisition of the copyrights.' Even though nothing had really changed, the
NBA asserted that as the owner of the copyrights of all televised NBA games it
had the discretion to choose which licenses would be granted, and the use of that
discretion to decide which broadcasters could be licensed was beyond an antitrust




41. Id. at 850.
42. NBA I, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1339 (N.D. 11. 1991).
43. Id. at 1344.
44. Id. at 1340.
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challenge.47
However, the NBA II court found the NBA's argument problematic. The court
stated that while the NBA, as an agent of the teams, is entitled to a fair return
for granting licenses to broadcast basketball games, it is not entitled to "exploit
its copyrights by using that monopoly power in order to limit distribution and
consumption of its product or to inflate artificially its value."4 According to the
NBA II court, the effect of only granting broadcast licenses to NBC and Turner
Broadcasting and eliminating Bulls' games on WGN was to decrease the number
of games available in the national television market.4 Such an anticompetitive
result, the court concluded, cannot be justified by mere copyright ownership.'
C. Transfer by the NBA of All Broadcast Rights to NBC
In NBA I, the court concluded that the NBA was not entitled to antitrust im-
munity under the Sports Broadcasting Act ("SBA") because
the Bulls, not the NBA, both owned and licensed the rights to the five games
that were transferred to WGN and which the 5-game reduction would eliminate.
This was not a sale or transfer by 'any league of clubs' but rather by the Bulls
themselves, though subject to league approval, and the antitrust laws therefore
apply.5'
As a result of this conclusion, the NBA amended its bylaws to provide that the
"copyright in all NBA game telecasts was reserved to the NBA," and not to the
individual teams.52 Further, the NBA authorized a new national television con-
tract with NBC, and allowed the individual teams, with the permission of NBC
and the NBA, to "exercise all rights to local and regional commercial broadcast
television and local non-broadcast television."53 In addition, the NBA repealed
the rule limiting to twenty-five the number of NBA game telecasts that individu-
al teams could license to superstations.54 Finally, the NBA required that if a
team was permitted to license national telecasts of NBA games to a superstation,
it would have to pay a fee to the NBA representing "the fair market value of
superstation telecasts in the national market."'55
The court next turned its attention to the application of section 1291 of the
SBA:
The antitrust laws ... shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among per-
sons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sport[] of bas-
ketball ... , by which any league of clubs participating in professional...
basketball... sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such
47. Id. at 851.
48. Id. at 852.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing NBA I, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 (N.D. I. 1991).
52. Id.
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league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games ... engaged in
or conducted by such clubs.'
In reference to section 1291 of the SBA, the NBA II court pointed out that, at
first blush, the NBA's new agreement with NBC did transfer rights of the NBA's
member clubs in sponsored basketball telecasts and, therefore, did, on its face,
fall within the language of section 1291.' However, the court noted that section
129258 "partially removes the exemption [of section 1291]... , thus making a
restriction on the televising of games illegal, except 'within the home territory'
of a club playing at home."'59 Therefore, the court reasoned that because the
NBA's agreement with NBC had the effect of limiting the number of games
shown on national television, antitrust immunity was not appropriate because the
SBA only permits such restrictions within the home territory of clubs playing at
home.W In reaching its conclusion that the NBA-NBC contract was not pro-
tected by the SBA, the NBA II court pointed out that, in the end, there were no
measurable changes in the amount of games that would be broadcast nationally
by NBC, TNT and WTBS, and individual teams continued to have the same
rights to contract for local and regional broadcasts of their games.6
D. NBA's Procompetitive Justifications for Preventing Superstation Broadcasts
The NBA first argued, as it did in NBA I, that restraints on superstation
broadcasts were lawful because they were necessary for the NBA's production of
competitive basketball.' The court in NBA II dismissed this argument, it had in
NBA I, by stating that "the antitrust laws were enacted for the 'protection of
competition, not competitors.' ,"' The court then concluded that any attempt to
justify restraints on competition as helping to maximize the teams' profits was
inherently flawed, unless such restraints would benefit consumers through in-
creased output and distribution.'
The NBA next argued that its new agreement with NBC actually fostered
expansion of output by encouraging new teams to join the league.' The NBA,
however, failed to identify any causal link between league expansion and restric-
tions on superstations.'
56. Id. at 854 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)).
57. Id. at 855.
58. Section 1292 of the SBA reads:
Section 1291 of this title shall not apply to any joint agreement described in the first sen-
tence in such section which prohibits any person to whom such rights are sold or trans-
ferred from televising any games within any area, except within the home territory of a
member club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home.
15 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994).
59. Id. (citing WTWV, Inc. v. National Football League, 678 F.2d 142, 144 (11th Cir. 1982)).
60. Id. at 856.
61. Id. at 858.
62. Id.
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The next justification offered by the NBA was that restrictions on
superstations improved the league's ability to negotiate contracts for national
broadcasts.67 That argument also failed because the league's new contracts actu-
ally reduced, by eleven, the number of NBA games shown on national televi-
sion.' In addition, the court in NBA H pointed out that, at the time they negoti-
ated their agreements with the NBA, both NBC and Turner Broadcasting were
well aware that WGN would be able to broadcast at least twenty-five games on
national television, making it clear that neither NBC nor Turner were very wor-
ried about superstation broadcasts.'
The NBA's final attempt to justify the restrictions on superstation broadcasts
consisted of conclusory statements about increasing the league's efficiency in
producing basketball, preventing "chaos" from developing within the league, and
insuring a competitive balance among the teams.70 The court simply responded
to these contentions by pointing out that they were not supported by any evi-
dence that would indicate that superstation telecasts have interfered with any of
these goals.7
The court in NBA I, therefore, concluded that the NBA's attempt at prevent-
ing WGN and the Bulls from televising any games was a naked restraint on
output which would have reduced the amount of the product available to con-
sumers.72 Such a restraint was not procompetitive and was not justified by the
NBA's proffered explanations.73 Therefore, it violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act in much the same way the previous attempt to reduce the number of games
from twenty-five to twenty had.74
E. Elimination of All Bulls' games on WGN
Regarding the proposal to eliminate all Bulls' games on WGN, the court had
very little to say. It simply concluded that if the loss of five games under NBA I
was sufficient to cause an antitrust injury, then the loss of twenty-five or more,
as the NBA sought in this case, must also constitute such an injury.75
F. The Superstation Fee
The NBA's argument that its limit on superstation broadcasts was necessary
to control what it deemed to be a free-rider problem was the only procompetitive
justification that the Seventh Circuit in NBA I-A considered seriously.76 In NBA
67. Id. at 860-61.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 861.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 862.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 862.
75. Id.
76. NBA I-A, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. VI:247
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I-A, the NBA suggested that the Bulls and WGN were free-riding because they
were benefiting from the NBA's advertising on NBC and TNT at no cost to
themselves.7 In order to correct this "free-rider" problem, the NBA proposed to
charge teams a fee for the right to broadcast on superstations.!8
The NBA II court stated that, on its face, the superstation fee was not unlike
the superstation ban such that it was a horizontal agreement among competitors
to reduce output and fix prices.79 However, the court acknowledged that the
NBA has invested a significant amount of capital into the development of its
product, and it was not unreasonable for the NBA to want to recoup some of the
revenues that the Bulls and WGN have received as a result of the league's in-
vestment.' By entering into agreements for national telecasts of their games
without compensating their opponents or the rest of the league, the Bulls, the
court reasoned, were free-riding on the efforts of the opposing teams and the
league.8 Therefore, the court concluded that the NBA's proposal to impose a
fee was reasonable and should be upheld. 2
G. Holding of NBA II
In sum, the court in NBA II held that (1) prohibiting the broadcast of Bulls'
games on WGN would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) the NBA can-
not avoid the application of antitrust laws; (3) the superstation blackout might be
invalid; (4) a superstation fee, set at a level which will not restrain distribution,
may be valid but should be negotiated by the parties before the court is asked to
rule on it; and (5) a reduction or restraint in the distribution of less than thirty
Bulls' games by WGN would be unreasonable.83
IV. CHICAGO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASS'N
("NBA I-A")84
After the Bulls, WGN and the NBA failed to reach an agreement as to a
reasonable superstation fee, the district court held a hearing on the issue, and in
lieu of testimony the Bulls submitted a report prepared by their valuation expert,
Paul J. Much.85 Much's report recommended that if a fee had to be imposed it
should be based on actual advertising revenues received by the Bulls and WGN
for broadcasts shown on WGN."6 Because league rules allow teams to keep all
77. Id. at 674.
78. NBA-Il, 874 F. Supp. 844, 865 (N.D. 111. 1995).
79. Id. at 867.
80. Id. at 868.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 869.
84. No. 90C6247, 1995 WL 519753 *1 (N.D. 11. Aug. 31, 1995).
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advertising revenue derived from their local markets, Much focused his report on
developing a method for determining the amount of WGN's revenues that were
derived from national broadcasts on WGN (or what is referred to as the "outer"
market).,7 Much's report contained three possible methods for calculating outer
market revenues and ultimately recommended that regardless of which method of
revenue calculation was chosen by the court, the superstation fee should be cal-
culated by dividing the outer market revenues three ways, giving one-third each
to the Bulls, WGN and the NBA.'
On the other hand, the NBA proposed a fee based on a calculation of the per-
game price paid for the license for regular season game telecasts sold to the
league's national cable carrier, Turner Broadcasting. 9 The per-game price
would then be adjusted to reflect the fact that WGN has a smaller reach than
Turner, and then adjusted further based on ratings.'
The NBA Il-A court concluded that the NBA's proposed fee schedule may still
result in reduced output and distribution of Bulls' games on WGN, in violation
of antitrust laws.9 Further, the court stated that the NBA's fee formula did not
reflect a reasonable measure of the value of WGN's broadcasts of Bulls'
games.' As for Much's report, the court disagreed with some of his calcula-
tions but found his method for calculating the reasonable outer market value of
the games to be persuasive.93 Finally, the court concluded that the NBA should
receive one-half of all outer market revenues (as opposed to the one-third pro-
posed by Much), in order to compensate the league and its member teams for
their contributions yet still provide an incentive for the Bulls and WGN to tele-
vise games nationally on WGN.94
V. IssUmS RESULTING FROM THE LrrIGATION IN NBA I AND NBA II
A. Given That This Decision Only Seems To Affect Two NBA Teams (The
Bulls and The Atlanta Hawks), Might It Serve As An Incentive For Other
NBA Franchises To Negotiate Superstation Agreements Leading Ultimate-
ly To More Basketball Games Being Televised Nationally?
While the superstation fees might initially serve as a disincentive to other
clubs to negotiate or seek superstation contracts, the weight of the court's deci-
sion in NBA II seems to favor clubs' expansion into superstation broadcasting.
This seems to be the case for two reasons: (1) in dictum, the court in NBA 11
placed a great deal of emphasis on what is good for consumers;95 and (2) other




91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id. at *5.
94. Id. at *9.
95. See NBA II, 874 F. Supp. 844, 860 (N.D. Il. 1995).
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than granting the NBA the right of first refusal in deciding which games will be
broadcast nationally on NBC and TNT, the fee seems to be the only other limit
placed on superstation broadcasts. 6
The fact that the court focused on the interest of consumers rather than that of
the NBA is significant because there appears to be a presumption that if the
NBA adopts any kind of policy that might have the effect of limiting the overall
number of televised games, it will be prima facie invalid. If this is the case, then
the NBA will be saddled with the very difficult burden, a burden which it failed
to meet in NBA 11," of proving that the policy is procompetitive even though
the number of televised games might be limited. Given that the NBA's attempt
to justify a limit on the number of nationally televised games failed in NBA II,"
it appears that the only way the NBA could successfully impose limits on a
particular franchise seeking to broadcast on a superstation would be for the
NBA, through its contract with NBC and TNT, to use all of its national broad-
casts to show only games with teams that have superstation contracts, thus exer-
cising its right of first refusal only as to a single team or a small group of teams.
While the NBA might try to justify such a move as market-driven," if it result-
ed in a superstation team being unable to broadcast at least thirty games on its
superstation, the NBA would have a difficult time proving that their true motive
was not anticompetitive.
As for the NBA's right of first refusal in choosing which games it will broad-
cast nationally on NBC and TNT, it appears that the injunction mandating that
each superstation club must be permitted to broadcast at least thirty games in a
season oW will serve as an effective safeguard against the NBA's abuse of its
right of first refusal. By ensuring the right of all clubs with superstation contracts
to broadcast at least thirty games, the NBA II court, in addition to placing the
NBA at risk of further court action in the event of a failure to comply with the
injunction, created an economic disincentive for the NBA to abuse its right of
first refusal for national broadcasts. The disincentive is that if the NBA was to
broadcast nationally a particular team to the point where it might cut too deeply
into that team's superstation broadcasts, the affected team, fearing it could lose
some of its superstation broadcasts, may, pursuant to the injunction, choose to go
ahead with its superstation broadcasts, even though the NBA may be broadcast-
ing the same games on NBC or TNT. If the same game is being broadcast na-
tionally on a superstation and on NBC or TNT, the NBA would stand to lose a
substantial amount of revenue to the competing superstation. Such a potential
revenue loss, coupled with the risk of further litigation, should be sufficient to
prevent the NBA from abusing its right of first refusal to nationally televised
96. See id. at 869.
97. See id.
98. 874 F. Supp. at 859.
99. For example, the NBA might argue that because a superstar like Michael Jordan draws such a
large national viewing audience, it makes economic sense for the NBA to use all of its nationally
televised broadcasts on NBC and/or TNT to show Bulls' games.
100. See NBA 11, 874 F. Supp. 844, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
19961
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basketball games.
Because the court in NBA II guaranteed any team with a superstation contract
the right to broadcast at least thirty games per season,' there is an incentive
for teams to enter into superstation broadcasting agreements if a superstation is
available in that team's home market. While any team considering a superstation
agreement will, of course, have to make an independent determination as to the
impact of the superstation fee on the economic viability of a superstation con-
tract, the fact that the fee is directly related to the amount of outer market reve-
nue generated by the agreement"° should serve to allay any concerns that an
individual club may have about entering into a superstation agreement. Further,
no individual team would be hurt by the additional national exposure that would
surely accompany thirty appearances on national television. In sum, the court in
NBA II seems to have created a strong incentive for an individual NBA franchise
to enter into a superstation agreement.
B. What About Local Sports Broadcasts That Are Picked Up Via Satellite
Outside Of Their Local Markets? Is There A Way To Calculate Outer
Market Revenue In These Circumstances? Is There Outer Market Adver-
tising Revenue In These Circumstances, And If So, Would A League Be
Able Recoup Some Of That Revenue Through A Fee For Local Games
Picked Up Via Satellite?
The answer to these questions seems to depend upon whether or not these
types of broadcasts generate much, if any, outer market revenue. If, in addition
to broadcasting the games via satellite, the commercial advertising is also trans-
mitted, then it would appear that outer market revenue could be generated. How-
ever, one of the key components in the calculation of outer market revenue was
the fact that superstations sell advertising based upon whether the ad will be
aired locally, nationally or both.' Since it is unlikely that a local station which
happens to be received via satellite in a bar across the country will attempt to
sell advertising aimed at the market in which the bar is located, one of the key
components for calculating the amount of revenue generated in that market ap-
pears to be absent.
In addition, even if the outer market revenue from satellite transmissions
could be accurately calculated, the amount generated, if any, would likely be so
insignificant that an attempt to calculate it would be more costly to the NBA
than the amount of revenue actually generated. Finally, it is difficult to believe
that satellite transmissions received in bars and restaurants have that significant
101. NBA II, 874 F. Supp. 844, 862 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
102. In other words, if the team generates no outer market revenue, it pays no fee. NBA Il-A, No.
90C6247, 1995 WL 519753 *1 (N.D. Il. Aug. 30, 1995).
103. It is important to point out, however, that this is a Seventh Circuit decision and that the NBA
has franchises in most, if not all, other circuits. Therefore, if this question were to be litigated in a
different circuit, it could just as easily go the other way.
104. NBA I1-A, No. 90C6247, 1995 WL 519753 *1, *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1995).
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of an impact on the NBA's nationally televised games. Most games broadcast via
satellite are shown because of a small niche in a particular market that is not
being satisfied by the NBA's national broadcast on a particular day." Also, if
that particular market niche was satisfied on that particular day by the NBA's
national broadcast, 6 then the amount of outer market revenue generated would
be even less significant because fans would then watch the game on NBC or
TNT. In sum, it would be extremely difficult to calculate the outer market reve-
nue generated by a satellite transmission, and even if it could be calculated, it
would likely be of very little significance to the NBA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it would appear that as far as the status quo is concerned, the
rulings in NBA II and NBA 11-A were consumer-friendly decisions, ensuring that,
at least for now, the number of NBA games shown on national television will be
not be reduced. As it stands now: Fans and Teams-i; NBA-0.
Fredrick B. Weber
105. For example, a group of Boston Celtics fans in Los Angeles may gather at a bar in Los An-
geles to watch the Celtics-Pistons game via satellite, because the local station is showing the Lakers-
Bulls game and the NBA's national broadcast that day is the Knicks-Sonics game. In such a situa-
tion, it would be hard to imagine that the local station in Boston will sell any of its commercial time
to clients seeking to reach the crowd in that bar in Los Angeles.
106. If, for example, the NBA's nationally televised game that day was the Celtics-Pistons game.
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